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Yours, Mine, and Ours: Law Firm Property Disputes
Douglas R. Richm ond .........................................................
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The Marriage Contract in Fine Art
Benjamin A. Templin .........................................................

45

Lateral movement by lawyers at all levels is now common. Ours is
an age of lawyer mobility. It is also an age of client transience.
Clients routinely change law firms, sometimes because they move
with lateral lawyers, and sometimes for their own reasons. Understandably, lawyer and client mobility have spawned difficult questions about law firm property rights. For competitive reasons, law
firms do not want departing lawyers taking the firm's intellectual
capital or property with them when they move laterally. Client files
are a treasure trove of intellectual capital and property that firms
may wish to protect when clients shift their allegiance. Departing
lawyers and clients have their own interests to advance and clearly
believe that they have property rights in materials they created or
for which they paid. Regardless of one's perspective, these are
critical issues in today's professional environment. This article
examines law firms' property rights and the competing rights of
clients and individual lawyers in several critical aspects. In doing
so, it discusses the application of trade secret law, fiduciary duty
theory, and professional conduct rules in ways that are equally
meaningful to courts, practicinglawyers, and scholars. Because the
issues discussed in the article are important and, yet, surprisingly,
there is relatively little authority squarely addressing them, this
articlefills a significant scholarly and practicalvoid.

From the fifteenth- to eighteenth-centuries, artists across Europe
and Englandpainted a scene depicting the negotiation of a marriage
contract. In nearly every painting, a notary sits or stands at a table,
quill in hand, memorializing the details of the dowry transfer. Some
artists celebrated the accord, while others condemned arranged
marriages made for purposes of status and money. Interestingly, at
the same time the artists painted, massive changes occurred in the
law and political philosophy aimed at changing some of the inherent
problems in marriage law, such as the rights of women, the influence

of parents, and divorce. To what extent does art reflect and influence
the law? The study of art and law is a nascent yet vibrant discipline.
By exploring the historicaland legal context of art, we gain a better
understandingof how the populace interpretedandfollowed the law,
as well as how artists tried to influence the development of social
norms. In the context of marriage contracts, this historical research
is timely given the currentdebate over same sex marriage.Much has
been made of the history and origin of marriageby both sides in the
same sex marriage controversy. The analysis of these paintings
yields some clues in how Western culture conceived of marriage
during a time of massive social and legal change.

The Effect of State Law on the Judge-Jury Relationship in Federal
Court
109
R ichard C . W orf, Jr ..................................................................
The conventional wisdom says that judge-jury rules in diversity
cases are governed solely by federal law. My article shows that, to
the contrary, under standard Erie principles, state law should (and
often already does) exert meaningful influence where state law
provides the rule of decision. I begin with a rigorous reexamination
of the relevant Supreme Courtprecedents in this field, and undertake
the first study of what the Supreme Court's decision in Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc. means for the judge-jury area. The
framework I develop harmonizes Gasperini and the existing Erie
cases, demonstrating that state law may influence the judge-jury
relationship in at least three ways: under Erie's constitutional
holding, under the Hanna twin-aims test, and under a properlyconceived Byrd-balancing test. In the next two Parts, I apply my
framework to two crucial problems in diversity litigation: the sufficiency of the evidence and the allocation of issues to judge or jury.
Unlike many Erie articles, which focus only on the key Supreme
Court cases, mine delves deeply into the federal appellate cases,
showing that state law already influences the judge-jury relationship
in ways that have gone unnoticed by the major treatises on federal
practiceand procedure.

Inequalities in Illinois Constitutional Equality
Jeffrey A. Parness and Laura J. Lee ...............................................

169

This article is a "first impression" piece on the failures by both the
Illinois General Assembly and the Illinois Supreme Court to implement the three specific constitutional equality mandates of 1970. The
1970 equality mandates go well beyond federal and other American
state constitutionalprovisions on discriminationby governments and
by private parties. They speak directly to employment and housing
matters. They expressly protect against discrimination based on
race, color, creed, national ancestry, sex, or physical or mental
handicap. The Illinois Human Rights Act was designed to implement
these mandates. But it falls short, though it extends beyond the
mandates in specifically protecting against discrimination based on
religion, national origin, marital status, military status, sexual
orientation, or unfavorable military discharge, as well as discrimination in financial credit access and public accommodations matters. The courts have deferred to the legislature. As a result, there

are,for example, no equality rights for public school children or for
employees of small companies ("covered" but "exempted" under the
Human Rights Act) even though the 1970 constitutional mandates
promise protections. Our article demonstrates how legislators and
judges can realize better the expectations of the constitutional
convention delegates and the voters of Illinois who approved the
three equality mandates. We hope the article will prompt reforms
that provide greater equality to those suffering from illegitimate
discrimination.
COMMENTS

Sexual Favoritism: A Cause of Action Under a "Sex-Plus" Theory
Susan J. B est ..........................................................................
2 11
This Comment avers that sexual favoritism is a form of "sex-plus"
discrimination.Traditionally, sexual favoritism has been argued as
being a form of sexual harassment. Therefore, in order to be successful in a claim for sexual favoritism, a plaintiff must prove sexual
harassment. The courts' treatment of sexual favoritism as sexual
harassment is problematicfor two reasons. First,placing the burden
of proof needed for sexual harassment-i.e., proof that the defendant
has created a hostile work environment-on plaintiffs injured by
sexual favoritism is excessively high. Secondly, because there is no
claim under the theory of sexual harassmentfor instancesof consensual sexual relationships in the work place, if such relationships
result in sexual favoritism to the detriment of a third party, those
third parties have neither legal action nor remedy. As an alternative
to the inadequacies of the current law, this Comment recommends
that courts adopt the sex-plus theory. Under this more fitting theory,
a plaintiff in a sexual favoritism lawsuit who is able to prove discrimination based on sex in conjunction with a sexual relationship,
or lack thereof would have a right to damages as a matter of law.

The Single-Purpose Container Exception: A Logical Extension of the
Plain View Doctrine Made Unworkable by Inconsistent Application
D aniel K egl ...................................................................................
237
This Comment examines the single-purpose container exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Since the exception
was recognized in Arkansas v. Sanders and revisited in Robbins v.
California, the federal circuits have not agreed as to what evidence
courts can consider when deciding whether or not to apply the
exception to a particular container. While some circuits allow
specialized police knowledge and the circumstances surrounding the
container's discovery to be considered, most disallow this evidence
in making the same determination.As a result, the continued use of
the single-purpose container exception results in an inconsistent
application of the Fourth Amendment to similarly-situated containers. This Comment concludes that, because of these inconsistencies,
the single-purpose container exception should be invalidated or at
least limited significantly in order to protect the Fourth Amendment's integrity.

